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CHAPTER 3 
State and Local Taxation 
GEORGE T. SHAW 
§3.1. Introduction. During the SuRVEY year, the Massachusetts 
personal income tax law was completely revised and rewritten. Not 
only did the legislature change the method of determining the tax, but, 
in so doing, it rejected the concept of the tax as a property tax, as it 
had been construed historically by the Supreme Judicial Court. The 
statute that made this sweeping change, Chapter 555 of the Acts of 
1971, principally Section 5 thereof, also made significant changes in 
other taxing statutes of the Commonwealth. These other changes will 
be discussed later in this chapter. 
A. INCOME TAXES 
§3.2. Definitions. Acts of 1971, c. 555, §5, repeals G.L., c. 62, 
§§ 1-8, the basic operative provisions of the personal income tax statute, 
substituting in their place new Sections 1-8. Each person preparing 
Massachusetts income tax returns or providing advice with respect to 
Massachusetts tax matters will need to read the new law carefully. The 
starting point under the new statute is the determination of "gross 
income," "adjusted gross income," and "income subject to taxation." 
"Gross income" is gross income for purposes of the Internal Revenue 
Code (hereafter, the "Code"), to which is added (i) interest on certain 
federally exempt governmental obligations, (ii) the federal dividend 
exclusion, (iii) earned income from foreign sources, and (iv) employer 
contributions to annuity plans for employees of certain charitable 
organizations and public schools; and from which is subtracted (i) 
federally taxable interest on United States obligations and (ii) federal 
Code Subchapter S income. 
"Adjusted gross income" is gross income as above defined, less the 
deductions allowable by Code §62 in determining adjusted gross in-
come, and less the deduction under Code §404 for contributions to 
certain employee benefit plans. However, the following Section 62 
deductions are not allowed: (i) the 50 percent lon&-term capital gains 
deduction, (ii) the depreciation and depletion deductions for life ten-
ants and trust income beneficiaries, (iii) that part of moving expense 
deductions attributable to moves to a principal place of work where 
the income from such work is not subject to Massachusetts taxation, 
(iv) any Subchapter S deduction, and (v) deductions relating to non-
taxable income. 
GEORGE T. SHAW is a member of the firm of Hemenway & Barnes, Boston. 
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"Income subject to taxation" is adjusted gross income as above de-
fined, less the following exempt income: (i) interest from obligations 
of Massachusetts and its political subdivisions, (ii) income from em-
ployee benefit plans of the United States or Massachusetts and its polit-
ical subdivisions, to which the employee has contributed, (iii) income 
received by corporations, except with respect to certain income of cor-
porate trustees, (iv) income of public charitable trusts and organiza-
tions, (v) income received from a fiduciary to the extent such income 
is taxed to the fiduciary, (vi) dividends from taxable transferable share 
trusts, partnerships and associations to the extent such dividends are 
exempt under Chapter 62 of the General Laws, (vii) income received 
by a fiduciary for a nonresident to the extent such income would be 
exempt from tax if received directly by the nonresident, and (viii) in-
terest and dividends from certain savings accounts and deposits to the 
extent of $100 for a single person or $200 for a husband and wife filing 
a joint return. 
§3.3. Classes of income under the 1971 amendment. Income subject 
to taxation, which is the net result of the additions to and subtractions 
from federal gross income described in the preceding paragraphs, is 
then divided into two separate classes of income, Section 4(a) income 
and Section 4(b) income. To the extent Section 4(a) income exceeds 
allowable exemptions and deductions, it is taxed at 9 percent. To the 
extent Section 4(b) income exceeds allowable exemptions and deduc-
tions, it is taxed at 5 percent. 
Briefly stated, Section 4(a) income consists of net capital gain, and 
interest and dividends from corporations and from trusts, partnerships, 
and associations with transferable shares. Specifically excluded from 
the interest taxable at 9 percent are interest and dividends from savings 
deposits, savings accounts, and shares and share savings accounts in 
specified Massachusetts and national savings or cooperative banks, 
trust companies, credit unions, and savings and loan associations. The 
interest excluded from Section 4(a) does constitute Section 4(b) income 
and is taxable at 5 percent, subject to the $100/$200 exclusion men-
tioned above. 
Capital gain and capital loss are determined pursuant to the rules 
in the Code, except that the 50 percent capital gains deduction is not 
allowed. "Net capital gain" is defined in Section 4(a)(3) as the excess 
of gains over losses "from sales or exchanges of capital assets or from 
other transactions deemed to be sales or exchanges of capital assets or 
granted gains treatment under the provisions of the Code." There is 
a parallel definition for net capital loss. Under both definitiGlls, capital 
loss carrybacks and carryovers are not taken into account. Net capital 
gain includes capital gains distributions of regulated investment com-
panies and real estate investment trusts. Gains resulting from the 
taking of property by eminent domain are no longer taxed at a special 
rate. Any gain taxed as ordinary income under the Code is taxed as 
Section 4(b) income rather than Section 4(a) income. Up to $1000 of 
the net capital loss is set off against interest and dividends, and any 
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excess net capital loss is available for the next five years to offset other 
Section 4(a) income and $1000 of interest and dividends. 
The limited deduction for interest paid on certain debts is carried 
over without substantial change to the new statute and is offset against 
Section 4(a) income. Against Section 4(b) income a taxpayer may de-
duct social security taxes paid and income from specified contributory 
governmental pension and retirement funds. However, Massachusetts 
taxes paid on business income may no longer be deducted. 
Income subject to taxation is exempt if total income for the year is 
less than $3000 for a single person and $5000 for a husband and wife 
filing a joint return, and no tax can reduce total income below those 
figures. Under the old law the applicable amounts were $2000/$2500. 
§3.4. Exemptions. The exemptions are substantially the same as 
before, except for the following changes: the exemption for a husband 
and wife filing a joint return has been increased from $2000 to $2600; 
the exemption for a married person filing a separate return has been 
reduced from $2000 to $1000; and a new exemption has been added for 
the premium for compulsory motor vehicle insurance for a single non-
business passenger vehicle. A husband and wife must file a joint return 
to claim this new exemption. In cases of short taxable years not caused 
by the taxpayer's death, exemptions are to be apportioned. The ex-
emptions are applied against Section 4(b) income; any excess may be 
applied against Section 4(a) income. 
§3.5. Basis of property. The old law contained its own provisions 
for determining the basis of property in the case of its sale or exchange. 
As illustrated by the following examples, the basi.s of property for 
Massachusetts purposes sometimes differed from the federal basis: (i) 
property passing by reason of death took as its basis for Massachusetts 
purposes the value at the time of death, while for federal purposes its 
basis was either its value at date of death or its value one year later if 
the alternate valuation election was made; (ii) the basis of mutual fund 
shares was reduced by capital gains distributions for Massa~husetts 
purposes, but not for federal purposes; and (iii) Massachusetts did not 
permit increasing the basis of donated property by the amount of gift 
taxes paid on account of the gift, as was permitted under the Internal 
Revenue Code. ' 
The new law provides that for property acquired after January I, 
1971, the basis shall be determined, "insofar as applicable/' in ac-
cordance with the Code, but if the basis of property was adjusted 
under G.L., c. 62 prior to January I, 1971, such adjustments shall 
continue in effect. It is likely that the State Tax Commission will take 
the position that the "insofar as applicable" provision will be oper-
ative where the federal basis would be the value on the alternate valua-
tion date or would be adjusted by reason of gift taxes paid on donated 
property. In these cases, because alternate valuation election and gift 
taxes are alien to the Massachusetts taxing system, the federal basis 
will not be used. The new statute is silent as to what basis will be used 
in the above situation, but presumably it would be the basis under the 
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old statute, i.e., the value at date of death with respect to alternate 
valuation election, and the donor's basis with respect to donated prop-
erty. The new statute needs clarification in this regard. 
§3.6. Dividends, earnings, and profits. Transferable share trusts, 
partnerships, and associations engaged in Massachusetts in any busi-
ness, activity, or transaction for the purpose of financial profit or 
gain, are now taxed under G.L., c. 62. Section 8(b) excludes from this 
provision regulated investment companies, real estate investment 
trusts, certain holding companies, and trusts, partnerships, and asso-
ciations deriving less than lO percent of their income within Massa-
chusetts. Dividends paid by partnerships, trusts, and associations 
subject to tax are exempt, while dividends paid by those not subject 
to tax are not exempt. Transitional rules will ensure that previously 
untaxed accumulated earnings and profits are not distributed to the 
shareholders free of tax. Eliminated are (a) the provisions whereby 
such partnerships, trusts, and associations were not subject to tax, 
but still had distributions treated as dividends to the shareholders, 
and (b) the provisions by which the entity could consent to be taxed 
itself, thereby making distributions which were tax free to the share-
holders. 
There are several obvious textual errors in Section 5 of Chapter 555 
as enacted, 1 presumably attributable to the haste with which it was 
drafted and the pressure placed upon the draftsmen by the legislative 
process. Corrective legislation will likely be prepared and submitted 
to the legislature. Anyone dealing with Chapter 555 will be well ad-
vised to look for the corrective legislation, which should be enacted 
during the 1972 SuRvEY year. 
§3. 7. Policy changes. As the foregoing discussion has shown, 
the new law is closely tied to the determination of federal gross income. 
All Section 4 income, unless specifically excluded or offset by allow-
able exemptions or deductions, is subject to tax, either at 5 percent or 
9 percent. In addition, some items not subject to federal tax are subject 
to Massachusetts tax (for example, earned income from foreign sources). 
The concept of an all-inclusive income tax is new to Massachusetts, 
and the changes which this new concept will make on a given tax 
return may not be readily apparent. However, some of the more im-
portant changes not described above should be noted: (1) annuities 
which were formerly taxed at 2 percent are now taxed to the extent 
taxed under the federal exclusion ratio; (2) rental income from real 
estate is taxable; (3) alimony payments are taxable to the extent taxed 
for federal purposes, but no corresponding deduction is allowed to 
the former spouse making the payments; and (4) gains from the sale 
of a principal residence are taxable in the same manner as they are 
for federal purposes. 
Of equal, if not greater, importance than the mechanics of calcula-
§3.6. 1 These textual errors involve typographical errors and errors relating to juxta-
position of paragraphs, e.g., the last three paragraphs of c. 555, §4(d) should be in §4(c). 
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ting the tax is the new philosophy of taxation which the statute repre-
sents. It will be remembered that the Supreme Judicial Court, in a long 
line of decisions, 1 has held that the tax imposed by G.L., c. 62 (prior 
to the 1971 amendment) was not an income tax of the excise type,2 but 
rather was a tax upon the property producing income and, hence, a 
property tax.3 A consequence of this characterization of the tax as a 
property tax has been the Court's unwillingness to apply the Massa-
chusetts tax to income derived from out-of-state property, on the 
grounds that the tax would be on the foreign property itself. Thus, 
the Court held that timber severance royalties received by a Massachu-
setts taxpayer with respect to Maine timberland were not subject to 
tax.4 Mining royalties were similarly exempted where received as a 
dividend from a transferable share trust whose sole asset was Minne-
sota real estate.5 The new statute should end once and for all the dis-
pute between the Court and the legislature over whether or not the 
personal income tax is a property tax. Short of an express legislative 
declaration that the new law is to be construed as a true income tax, 
the legislature has done as much as possible to enact a tax having all 
the characteristics of an income tax. It is to be hoped that the Supreme 
Judicial Court will construe it as such, for this interpretation will 
allow the Chapter 62 tax to be an efficient and effective revenue-col-
lecting measure. 
B. CoRPORATION TAxEs 
§3.8. Net income, deductions, gross investment income. Acts of 
1971, c. 555, made several changes in G.L., c. 63, relating to the tax-
ation of corporations. In computing "net income," banks and trust 
companies may no longer deduct foreign, state, and local income, nor 
may they deduct franchise and capital stock taxes paid. Furthermore, 
they may not take advantage of credits allowed under the Internal 
Revenue Code. 1 Similarly, in computing "net operating income," 
savings and cooperative banks and savings and loan associations may 
not deduct federal and state taxes paid.2 
Domestic insurance companies within the scope of Chapter 175 are 
now subject to a tax equal to 1 percent of their total gross investment 
income,3 and savings banks having insurance departments must pay 
a tax equal to 1 percent of the total gross investment income earned 
§3.7. 1 E.g., State Tax Commn. v. Fine, 356 Mass. 51, 247 N.E.2d 701 (1969), and 
cases therein cited. 
2 Riesman v. Commissioner of Corps. and Taxation, 326 Mass. 574, 576, 95 N.E.2d 656, 
658-659 (1950). 
3 "In its essence a tax upon income derived from property is a tax upon the property." 
Opinion of the Justices, 220 Mass. 613, 624, 108 N.E. 570, 574-575 (1915). 
4 State Tax Commn. v. Wheatland. 343 Mass. 650, 180 N.E.2d 340(1962). 
5 State Tax Commn. v. Fine, 356 Mass. 51,247 N.E.2d 701 (1969). 
§3.8. 1 Acts of 1971, c. 555, §25, amending G.L., c. 63, §I. 
2 Acts of 1971, c. 555, §26, amending G.L., c. 63, §II. 
3 Acts of 1971, c. 555, §27, adding §22A to G.L., c. 63. 
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from the assets of their insurance departments.4 These measures are 
clearly revenue-raising in purpose. The same cannot be said for the 
provision imposing a tax on insurance companies (other than life in-
surance companies) equal to 50 percent of increased income, above a 
specified level, which is attributable to savings in costs under the no-
fault insurance law but is not returned to the policyholders.5 
Brought within the definition of "domestic business corporations" 
and "foreign corporations" under Chapter 63, and made subject to tax 
thereunder, are charitable corporations organized under Chapter 180 
which are not exempt from taxation under Code §501.6 In determining 
"taxable net income," domestic business corporations and foreign 
corporations may no longer deduct from net income dividends re-
ceived from transferable share trusts, partnerships, and associations 
engaged in business in Massachusetts,? or taxes paid to Massachu-
setts which are deductible under the Code.8 
C. SALES AND USE TAXES 
§3.9. Definitions. Minor changes have been made in G.L., cc. 
64H and 64I, which impose the sales and use taxes. The definition of 
"engaged in business in the Commonwealth" has been rewritten, but 
no substantive change has been made,1 and the definition of "retailer" 
has been amended to include the Commonwealth or any of its political 
subdivisions or agencies when making retail sales of a kind ordinarily 
made by a private person.2 This latter change appears to have been 
prompted in part by a decision3 of the Supreme Judicial Court during 
the SuRVEY year, holding invalid a regulation of the State Tax Com-
mission4 which subjected to the sales tax those sales by the United 
States, the Commonwealth, or any political subdivision or agency of 
property ordinarily sold by private persons. The Court concluded that 
there was no statutory authorization for the regulation since the word 
"person" in the sales tax statute was not broad enough to include 
governmental bodies, specifically municipal electric light depart-
ments. 
The meals tax, which is akin to a sales and use tax, now is applied 
to alcoholic beverages sold for consumption on the premises, whether 
or not accompanying meals.5 In a related change, alcoholic beverages 
4 Acts of 1971, c. 555, §29, amendingG.L., c. 63, §18. 
5 Acts of 1971, c. 555,§27A. 
6 Acts of 1971, c. 555, §32, amendingG.L., c. 63, §30. 
7 Acts of 1971, c. 555,§33, amendingG.L.,c. 63, §38A. 
8 Acts of 1971, c. 555, §34, amending G.L., c. 63, §38A; Acts of 1971, c. 555, §36, amend-
ing G.L., c. 63, §42A. 
§3.9. 1 Acts of 1971,c. 555,§40, amendingG.L., c. 64H,§l(5). 
2 Actsof 1971, c. 555,§41, adding subsection (e) toG.L., c. 64H, §1(9). 
3 City of Taunton v. Commissioner of Corps. and Taxation, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 501, 
268 N.E.2d 676. 
4 Emergency Regulation No. 13, dated july 27,1966. 
5 Acts of 1971,c. 555,§44A, amendingG.L., c. 64B, §1. 
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served as a part of a meal and subject to the meals tax are defined as 
"food products" and thus are exempt from the sales tax. 6 Also, the 
exemption from the sales tax of sales of alcoholic beverages to the ex-
tent such sales are subject to tax under Chapter 63A (gross receipts 
tax on sales by licensed alcoholic beverage sellers) has been repealed. 7 
Of more importance is the narrowing of the definitions of certain 
key terms relating to the exemption from the sales tax of sales of ma-
terials, tools, and fuels which become an ingredient or component 
part of tangible personal property to be sold, or which are consumed 
and used directly and exclusively for certain manufacturing and pro-
duction processes, including use in an industrial plant in the actual 
manufacture of property to be sold. Formerly, "consumed and used" 
and "industrial plant" were not defined; that omission has now been 
remedied.8 A material is "consumed and used" only if it has a normal 
useful life of less than one year or if its cost is currently deductible 
for federal income tax purposes. An "industrial plant" is defined as 
a factory at a fixed location primarily engaged in manufacturing, 
converting, or processing property for retail sale. Similarly, machin-
ery or its replacement parts must be used "directly and exclusively" 
for specified manufacturing and production processes in order for its 
sale to be exempt. There are now detailed criteria for determining 
whether such machinery and parts are used "directly and exclusively" 
for the specified purposes.9 Questions of interpretation under these 
exemptions and comparable ones in other states have been legion. 10 
The new statute should resolve some of the problems presented by 
these exemptions, ll but one can still expect considerable litigation 
to arise under these provisions. 
D. INHERITANCE TAXES 
§3.10. Statutory changes. Chapter 555 of the Acts of 1971 also 
made significant changes in the substantive and procedural taxing 
provisions of the inheritance tax law. One important change relates 
to the taxability of proceeds of life insurance on the decedent's life. 
Heretofore the law with respect to the taxation of such proceeds was 
a matter of case law, with the general rule being that such proceeds 
were not subject to the inheritance tax if they were payable to a named 
beneficiary (including the trustee of an inter vivos trust) other than the 
decedent's executor or administrator or the trustee of his testamentary 
6 Acts of 1971, c. 555, §44, amendingG.L., c. 64H, §6(h). 
7 Acts of 1971, c. 555, §45, amending G.L., c. 64H, §6(g). 
8 Acts of 1971, c. 555, §45, amendingG.L., c. 64H, §6(r). 
9 Acts of 1971, c. 555, §45, amendingG.L., c. 64H, §6(s). 
IOSee, e.g., Courier Citizen Co. v. Commissioner of Corps. and Taxation, 1971 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 21,266 N.E.2d 284; Wakefield Ready-Mixed Concrete Co. v. State Tax Commn., 
356 Mass. 8, 247 N.E.2d 869 (1969), discussed in 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.20. 
11 For example, the issue posed in Courier Citizen Co. v. Commissioner of Corps. and 
Taxation, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 21,266 N.E.2d 284, relating to possible sales tax exemption 
of particular items of materials, machinery, and replacement parts, was thereafter re-
solved by Acts of 1971, c. 555, §45, amending G.L., c. 64H §§6(r) and (s). 
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trust.l As a result of a new statute, applicable to decedents dying on 
or after July 22, 1971, life insurance proceeds are taxable to the extent 
of (i) amounts receivable by the decedent's executor or administrator 
and (ii) amounts receivable by all other beneficiaries under policies 
with respect to which the decedent possessed, at the time of his death, 
any of the incidents of ownership within the meaning of Internal 
Revenue Code §2042.2 However, the first $25,000 of such amounts 
receivable by a surviving spouse or by surviving children as named 
beneficiaries is exempt. Provisions are made for allocating the exemp-
tion among the spouse and children. It is understood that the Massa-
chusetts Inheritance Tax Bureau considers the $25,000 exemption 
applicable to life insurance proceeds payable to the trustee of an inter 
vivos trust for the benefit of the spouse and/or children. The result 
of these changes is that the federal rule for the taxability of life insur-
ance proceeds is for all practical purposes the new Massachusetts rule, 
subject to the $25,000 exemption. Estate planning with respect to life 
insurance should be made easier now that the tax consequences of 
various planning techniques will be essentially the same for federal 
estate and Massachusetts inheritance tax purposes. 
In another move bringing the Massachusetts tax in closer conform-
ity with the federal estate tax, the legislature has provided that annu-
ities and life estates shall be valued in accordance with the valuation 
tables in the federal estate tax regulations,3 rather than pursuant to 
the American Experience Table, which formerly had been used.4 This 
change, too, applies to deaths on or after July 22, 1971. 
The due date of inheritance taxes has been changed to conform with 
recent changes in the due date for the federal estate tax. For deaths on 
or after July 22, 1971, taxes on present interests are due nine months 
after the date of death, taxes on future interests are due six months 
after the right of possession or enjoyment accrues, and the succession 
tax under Chapter 65A is due twelve months after the date of death.5 
The procedure and timing for filing inheritance tax forms have 
been clarified and simplified. These changes become effective on Jan-
uary 1, 1972. The procedure which is about to be superseded has been 
subject to considerable confusion because the Inheritance Tax Bureau 
has issued policy directives and memoranda which have not only 
seemed at odds with existing statutes but which themselves were 
changed with some frequency. The result was that many practitioners 
felt uncertain about the procedure to be followed. It is hoped that this 
confusion and uncertainty will be dispelled by the new statute. It 
should be noted that the bureau feels that the statute does not pre-
scribe a new procedure but rather codifies the existing practice ad-
ministratively established by the bureau. 
Chapter 555 of the Acts of 1971 provides that a "return" shall be 
§3.1 0. 1 See generally Barrett and Bailey, 4A Mass. Practice Series§ 1037 ( 1970). 
2 Acts of 1971, c. 555, §52, amendingG.L., c. 65, §I. 
3 Treas. Reg. §20.2031-10(1970). 
• Acts of 197l,c. 555, §56, amendingG.L., c. 65, §13. 
5 Acts of 1971, c. 555, §§54 and 62, amending G.L., c. 65, §7, and c. 65A, §2, respectively. 
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filed on or before the due date of the tax. 6 At least initially the "re-
turn" will consist of the familiar "L" series of forms: the L-1, L-16, 
L-16A and L-19X; but it is to be hoped that these forms can be con-
solidated into a single form similar to the federal Form 706. The re-
turn is to include or be accompanied by a full and complete inventory, 
an attested copy of the will, a copy of the federal estate tax return (if 
applicable), a computation of the tax, and a list of deductible debts 
and expenses (if an election is made to itemize the deductions rather 
than take the standard deduction). The return is also to be accom-
panied by payment of any balance of the tax shown to be due and a 
$10 filing fee. In cases where a federal estate tax return must be filed, 
the commissioner is authorized to grant an extension for filing the 
return until three months after final settlement of federal estate taxes. 
Extensions may be granted in other cases for good cause, but in any 
case (including federal estate tax cases) are not automatic but must be 
applied for on new form 58-31A. The application must be filed on or 
before the due date of the tax and must be accompanied by an amount 
equal to the tax estimated to be due. If at least 80 percent of the tax 
actually due is not paid as of the due date, any extension previously 
granted will be deemed void, and the return will be treated as a late 
return with corresponding penalties. However, of more importance 
is the requirement that the entire tax due must be paid on or before 
the due date of the tax in order to avoid interest payments.7 Here-
after, payment of 80 percent of the final tax on or before the due date 
will prevent the imposition of a penalty but not imposition of interest 
at 8 percent. 
The election to itemize deductions rather than take the standard 
deduction, available in cases of less than $100,000 of property subject 
to taxation, will henceforth be made when the return is filed. 8 For-
merly the election had to be filed within 210 days of the filing of the 
bond of the executor, administrator, or other person responsible for 
the tax. 
To summarize the statutory procedure, in nonfederal estate tax 
cases the return with the necessary supporting documents ahd pay-
ment of the tax due must be filed on or before the due date of the tax. 
Nothing is required to be filed before that time. In federal estate tax 
cases an application for extension must be filed on or before the due 
date, together with payment of the estimated tax due; the return and 
the balance of the tax, if any, is due three months after the federal es-
state tax is settled. 
There is also a new procedure for obtaining abatement of inheri-
tance taxes by application and hearing from the State Tax Commis-
sion.9 This is in addition to existing procedures available in the pro-
bate courts. 
§3.11. Nonqualified employee benefit plans. Jacob Narva entered 
6 Acts of 1971, c. 555, §57, amending G.L., c. 65, §22. 
7 Acts of 1971, c. 555, §55, amending G.L., c. 65, §II. 
8 Acts of 1971, c. 555, §59, amending G.L., c. 65, §27. 
9 Acts of 1971, c. 555, §59, adding§27A to G.L., c. 65A. 
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into an employment contract with his corporation providing, inter 
alia, for annual payments of a specified amount in the event of his 
retirement or disability and for payment of a lump sum to his widow 
upon his death, in addition to monthly payments to the widow for her 
life, up to a maximum of 120 payments. The imposition of inheritance 
taxes attributable to the benefits payable upon Mr. Narva's death was 
contested in Narva v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation. 1 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the death benefit constituted 
property in which Mr. Narva had an interest at his death and, further, 
that the transfer to his widow was intended to take effect in possession 
or enjoyment after death. Accordingly, the death benefit was held sub-
ject to the inheritance tax. 
Apparently Mr. Narva died before the effective date of a statute 
granting an exemption from inheritance taxes for payments from qual-
ified retirement and pension plans to the extent attributable to em-
ployer contributions.2 By negative inference from that statute, pay-
ments from nonqualified plans are subject to inheritance taxes. 
Employment agreements with retirement and death benefit provisions 
similar to those at issue in Narva are not uncommon, especially in 
small companies. Such agreements have most of the characteristics of 
unfunded employee benefit plans, but of course they are not qualified. 
The Narva decision, together with the exemption for qualified plans, 
will make it difficult for taxpayers to argue that such nonqualifying 
plans are not subject to inheritance taxes. 
§3.12. Inheritance taxes payable out of the residue. In Welling-
ton v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 1 decedent's will 
provided that all estate and inheritance taxes payable on account of 
his death were to be paid out of the residue of his estate. Decedent 
and his wife owned jointly several bank accounts on which inheri-
tance taxes were paid. The commissioner also assessed a tax on the 
inheritance attributable to the jointly held property, on the theory 
that the tax on the jointly held property which was paid out of the 
residue was in effect a pecuniary legacy to decedent's wife, the sur-
viving joint owner. 
The validity of the additional assessment hinged on the interpreta-
tion of G.L., c. 65, §19, providing that "[w]hen provision is made by 
any will or other instrument for payment of the legacy or succession 
tax upon any gift thereby made out of any property other than that 
so given, no tax shall be chargeable upon the sum to be applied in pay-
ment of such tax." The Supreme Judicial Court was unable to decide 
whether this statute , standing by itself, would prohibit the additional 
assessment. Therefore, it avoided that issue and rested its decision that 
the tax was improperly assessed on the fact that from 1916 until 1968 
the commissioner, as a matter of practice, had not assessed taxes where 
§3.11. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 117,266 N.E.2d638. 
2 G.L., c. 65, §1, added by Acts of 1969,c. 675, §I. 
§3.12. 1 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh. 789,269N.E.2d264. 
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inheritance taxes on joint property were paid from the residue. The 
Court felt that any change of 50-year-old administrative practice 
should more appropriately be made by the legislature. For this reason 
the Court refused to follow the commissioner's post-1968 interpreta-
tion of the statute, on the basis of which the additional tax was 
assessed. 
The opinion in Wellington is unfortunate in that it does not re-
solve the question of what the statute means. The issue is apparently 
settled as to joint property, but not as to other property subject to tax 
which passes outside of the will, such as life insurance proceeds and 
inter vivos trusts. The tax-from-residue clause is a common provision 
in wills, and that statute should be clarified by either legislative or 
judicial interpretation so that estate planners will know its inheritance 
tax consequences in advance. 
E. REAL PROPERTY TAXES 
§3.13. Definition of real estate. A determination of what consti-
tutes real estate for purposes of G.L., c. 59 real property taxes is in 
many cases difficult to make and has been the subject of considerable 
controversy. The statute says that real estate includes "all buildings 
and other things erected thereon or affixed thereto." 1 Recently the 
Supreme Judicial Court has decided two cases involving questions of 
interpretation under this definition, 2 and there is pending before the 
Court at least one other case,3 which will be decided in the 1972 SuRVEY 
year. 
In Ellis v. Board of Assessors of Acushnet, 4 a 60-foot-long mobile 
home located in a trailer park and used as a year-round permanent 
residence was held to be taxable as real estate. The mobile home rested 
on, and was attached to, a poured concrete foundation with a full cellar 
in which was located a hot water heater and a 275-gallon oil tank. No 
wheels, axles, or hitching posts were attached to the mobile home or 
were owned by the taxpayer, although the mobile home had been 
trailed from Baltimore by the seller on the seller's wheels. 
If the case could have been decided solely on the basis of the statu-
tory definition of real estate referred to above, it would have been quite 
unremarkable because, as the Appellate Tax Board concluded,5 the 
mobile home was for all intents and purposes identical to any other 
conventional home. However, the case had to be considered in light 
of the statutory exemption6 from real estate taxes granted to mobile 
§3.13. I G.L., c. 59, §3. 
2 Ellis v. Board of Assessors of Acushnet, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1633, 265 N.E.2d 491; 
Board of Assessors of Dartmouth v. B. A. Simeone, Inc., 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 904, 269 
N.E.2d 663. 
3 Board of Assessors of Swampscott v. Lynn Sand and Stone Co., 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
1771, -N.E.2d-. [This case was decided subsequent to the writing of this chapter. For a 
further discussion, see n.l6 infra.] 
4 1970Mass.Adv.Sh.I633,265N.E.2d491. 
5 Id. at 1634,265 N.E.2dat 492. 
• G.L., c. 59, §5, cl. Thirty-sixth. 
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homes subject to the $6 monthly license fee under Chapter 140.7 That 
chapter defined mobile home to mean "a dwelling unit built on a 
chassis and containing complete electrical, plumbing and sanitary 
facilities, and designed to be installed on a temporary or permanent 
foundation for permanent living quarters."8 The taxpayer's mobile 
home clearly was a Chapter 140 mobile home, and by the seemingly 
plain language of the statute was subject to the monthly license fee. 
On that basis it was exempt from the property tax. 
The Court recognized that the conflict between the two statutes 
raised constitutional problems. If Chapter 140 was held to govern, 
then the taxpayer's mobile home would not have been subject to the 
real estate tax, while a similar conventional house would have been. In 
the view of the Court, that result would have constituted a dual stan-
dard of taxation, prohibited by Article X of the Declaration of Rights 
of the Massachusetts Constitution. In order to resolve the case, short 
of passing on the constitutionality of either statute, the Court reviewed 
the history of the applicable sections of Chapter 140 and determined 
that the legislature, in enacting the 1964 amendment9 to Chapter 140 
which inserted the definition of mobile home quoted above, "was not 
concerned with taxation but rather desired to deal with other prob-
lems."10 The Court thereby construed Chapter 140 as not prohibiting 
the imposition of real estate taxes on taxpayer's mobile home, saying 
that a literal reading of Chapter 140, Section 32L (the section defining 
a mobile home) did not "foreclose the issue of taxation in every in-
stance." 11 
The Court's decision may be sound if viewed solely in terms of not 
allowing the mobile home in question to escape taxation as real prop-
erty. The reasoning by which the Court reached its decision is not 
persuasive, however. To say that legislative history indicated that the 
legislature was not concerned with taxation but with "other prob-
lems," undefined in the opinion, is misleading. Chapter 59, Section 5, 
Clause Thirty-sixth, and Chapter 140, Section 32G, expressly provide 
for the exemption from real estate taxes for mobile homes subject to 
the monthly license fee. The collection of these fees from the mobile 
home park operator is effected through the procures applicable to 
collection of ta~es on personal property. Although the monthly fee 
is denominated a license fee, it seems to be more in the nature of a pay-
ment in lieu of taxes, especially when applied to a permanently affixed 
mobile home. It should also be noted that the Mobile Homes Com-
mission, created by the legislature in 1962, strongly recommended in 
its reports that mobile homes be taxed the same as conventional homes 
and that the exemption from real estate taxes be repealed. It can be 
concluded that the legislature, although aware of the problem when 
7 G.L., c. 140, §32G. 
'G.L., c. 140, §32L. 
9 Acts of 1964, c. 592, §14, amending G.L., c. 140, §32L. 
10 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1633, 1636,265 N.E.2d491, 493. 
11 I d. at 1635,265 N .E.2dat 492. 
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it enacted the 1964 amendment to Chapter 140, chose to extend the 
exemption to mobile homes such as the one in question. In truth, the 
Supreme Judicial Court did not "construe" Chapter 140 and its cross-
references to Chapter 59 but simply ignored the clear statutory lan-
guage in order to avoid the constitutional issue. 
The Court could have avoided that issue in another way: by allow-
ing the exemption to mean what it said and by deciding that the mo-
bile home in question was not "real estate" within the meaning of 
Chapter 59. Chapter 140 dealt expressly with mobile homes and clear-
ly provided an exemption, while Chapter 59, Section 3, defining 
real estate, is a general definitional section worded in a nonspecific 
manner. In the event of a conflict, under usual rules of statutory inter-
pretation a statute dealing specifically with the subject matter, such 
as Chapter 140, is to be applied rather than a general statute, especially 
one at least 100 years old. 12 It is submitted that the Court more 
easily and more soundly could have thus distinguished factually the 
mobile home in question from a conventional house, thereby avoiding 
the problem of a dual standard of taxation. The solution suggested 
would not have done the injustice to Chapter 140 which did result 
from the Court's opinion. 
It is apparent that legislative action is needed in this area. The most 
equitable course for the legislature to take would be to exclude from 
the Chapter 140-Chapter 59 exemption all mobile homes which are 
so situated as to be permanently affixed to the site. The exemption 
would remain for homes which are truly mobile, those which can be 
readily towed from location to location by the owner himself. 
The question of what is real estate for purposes of Chapter 59 also 
arises in the context of large manufacturing or processing equipment 
attached or affixed to the ground at commercial or industrial sites. In 
Board of Assessors of Dartmouth v. B. A. Simeone, Inc., 13 the Su-
preme Judicial Court affirmed the Appellate Tax Board's finding that 
a particular type of semiportable asphalt plant was machinery used 
in the manufacture of bituminous concrete, could be moved after the 
removal of a few nuts, and was not erected on or affixed to the land. 
The brief for the board of assessors indicates, however, that the plant 
in question stands 55 feet high and weighs over 100 tons. It was manu-
factured in preassembled sections, shipped to the site by railroad car 
imd truck, and assembled on foundation piers by crane. The absence 
of such facts in the Appellate Tax Board's findings indicates that those 
findings do not present a completely accurate view o( the object in 
question. What was involved in this case was the relationship between 
the application of the real estate tax to "other things" erected on or 
affixed to the ground, and the exemption from real estate taxes of prop-
erty of a domestic manufacturing corporation other than "real estate, 
poles and underground conduits, wires and pipes." 14 This same rela-
12 Cf. Clancy v. Wallace, 288 Mass. 557, 193 N.E. 546 (1934). 
13 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 904,269 N.E.2d 663. 
14 The pertinent statute is G.L., c. 59, §5, d. Sixteenth (3). 
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tionship is again at issue in Board of Assessors of Swampscott v. Lynn 
Sand and Stone Co., 15 a case now pending before the Supreme Judicial 
Court. The Court in Simeone did not adequately resolve the question 
of when, if ever, machinery of such size as to be permanently affixed 
to the land can ever be considered real estate and be subject to the real 
estate tax. Lynn Sand and Stone will present the Court with another 
opportunity to deal with that question, for the case involves rock-
crushing and concrete-mixing equipment which can be as long as 
445 feet and weigh up to 150 tons.'6 
§3.14. Exemption for charitable organizations. Chapter 59 of the 
General Laws exempts from real estate taxes "real estate owned by or 
held in trust for a charitable organization and occupied by it or its 
officers for the purposes for which it is organized .... " 1 In Milton 
Hospital and Convalescent Home v. Board of Assessors of Milton, 2 the 
issue presented was whether a portion of a hospital building rented to 
doctors on the hospital staff for their private offices was entitled to the 
exemption. The Supreme Judicial Court held, over the dissent of Jus-
tice Reardon, that the exemption was not available because the offices 
were not occupied by the hospital or its officers and, even if they had 
been so occupied, they were not occupied for the purposes for which 
the hospital was formed. 
From the opinion it appears that doctors conducted their private 
practices from the offices, selecting their own patients and setting their 
own fees. The hospital did not control the doctors' activities. The 
situation was of direct benefit to the hospital, not only because the 
doctors were readily available in the event of emergency, but also be-
cause it helped in attracting doctors to the staff. However, the Court 
rightly concluded that the offices were occupied by the doctors for 
conducting their private medical practices, rather than by the hospital 
or its officers in furtherance of the hospital's charitable purpose. 
§3.15. Assessment practices. First National Stores, Inc. v. Board 
of Assessors of Somerville1 emphasized how important it is that boards 
of assessors pay close attention to the relationship between sales prices 
for properties and the assessments of those properties. Since the proper 
method of assessing real property is at 100 percent of fair cash value,2 
and since the sales price of real estate is usually a reliable indication 
15 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1771,-N.E.2d-. 
16 Brief for Board of Assessors at 17. [Lynn Sand and Stone was decided after the 
writing of this chapter. The Supreme Judicial Court held that "even if machinery by 
reason of its bulk . . . could be regarded as having become a part of real estate for some 
purposes, its predominant aspect for the purposes of §5, Sixteenth (3), remains that of 
machinery rather than of real estate." 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1771, 1774,-N.E.2d-, -.] 
§3.14. 1 G.L., c. 59, §5, d. Third. 
2 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh.l203, 271 NI.E.2d 745. 
§3.15. 1 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh.ll,265N.E.2d848. 
2"It is a wholly illegal practice to assess land at less than 100% of full fair cash value." 
Bennett v. Board of Assessors of Whitman, 354 Mass. 239, 237 N.E.2d 7 (1968). See Mass. 
Const. pt. 2, c. I, §I, art. IV; id. pt. I, art. X; G.L., c. 59, §§38, 52. 
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of its fair cash value, the sales price cannot be wholly ignored in mak-
ing subsequent assessments. Yet the Somerville assessors testified in 
the instant case that they did not take recent sales prices into consider-
ation when assessing properties but relied on visual observation and 
inspection of the properties. 
In support of its claim for an abatement of real estate taxes, the tax-
payer introduced evidence of real estate transactions in Somerville 
over a six-year period and the subsequent assessments of those same 
properties. That evidence showed that the aggregate assessed value of 
those properties, in the year following the year of sale, average 40 per-
cent of the aggregate sales price. During the same period, contended 
the taxpayer, its three groups of Somerville properties were assessed 
at 124.2 percent, 97.2 percent, and 74 percent of their respective fair 
cash values. The taxpayer also had an expert witness testify as to the 
value of the properties for which abatements were sought. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the evidence presented by 
the taxpayer, especially the disparity between sales prices and subse-
quent assessments, was sufficient to support an inference of discrimi-
natory assessment practices, thereby placing the burden on the asses-
sors to show that they had made a reasonable effort to arrive at full and 
fair cash value. 
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